The distinction between representational and embodied knowledge (knowing-that versus knowing-how) has gained new significancethrough the investigation of implicit memory.This kind of memory is formedi nt he course of the interactiono fo rganism and environment: Recurring patterns of interaction are sedimented in the form of sensorimotor,b ut also affect-motor schemes. We mays peako fa ni mplicit "bodym emory" that underlies our habits and skills, connectingb odya nd environment through cycles of perception and action. This embodied knowledge is actualizedbysuitable situations or by overarching volitional acts, without necessarilyb eing madee xplicit.
1I ntroduction
Gilbert Ryle'ss eminal contraposition of twof undamental forms of knowledge, knowingthat and knowinghow (Ryle1949), maybetracedback to Aristotle'sdistinction in the 'Nicomachean Ethics' between epistêmê and technê,t he first meaning theoretic or scientific knowledge, thel atter skill or craft. Bertrand has proposed the terms "knowledgeb ya cquaintance" and "knowledgeb yd escription", pointingout that thef ormer is obtainedthrough ad irecti nteractionwith objects or situations,whereas the latteri sa cquired in an indirect way, namelyb ased on propositional language,f or example, throughd escriptiono re xplanation.
There has been al ong and still ongoing debate on whether these two types of knowledge belong to distinct categories, or whether one depends upon the other,a nd if so, which is the more basico ne.¹ However,i fi ti st rue that in our intuitived ealings with situations we always "know moret han we can tell" (Polanyi 1967) , and if we thus could never fullydescribe how to dance aT angoorto recognize the "mischievous" expression in someone'sf ace, then this implicit knowing mayi np rinciple not be completelyc onverted into declarative or symbol-based knowledge.
With regard to developmental psychologyt oo, it quicklybecomes clear that our everydayr elation to the world is based on af undamental familiarity and skilfulnessw hich is alreadya cquired in earlyi nfancy before the development of symbolicallya nd verballym ediated knowledge.A tt he end of their first year of life, babies are capable of highlyd ifferentiated interactions with persons and objectsw hich doubtlesslyf ulfilt he criteria of knowledge by acquaintance, long before conceptual knowledge of others is acquired. Heret oo, knowing how precedes knowing that (on this,s ee below).
Nevertheless,concepts of knowledge that maybedescribed as propositional, symbol-basedo rr epresentational are clearly prevalent in present-day cognitive and social sciences. Whether the question is how we recognize the world in general or how we perceive the social other,the wayt he question is posed already assumesadistant observerwho learns about the world not through practical interaction, engagement and participation but through detacheddescription, modelling or reconstruction. To acquire knowledge then means to form an idea, a representation or am odel of the object or of the other,o nw hich basis one can thenp roceed to action. Accordinglyt he mind is conceiveda sasystem of inner models, constructs or representations which todaya re localized in the brain and enable the prediction of changes in the external world. In this way, however,the knower and the known, or cognitionand the world remain separated from each other on principle.
Tworelated approaches are currentlychallengingt his cognitivist paradigm, namelyt he embodied and enactive approach to cognition on the one hand and the phenomenology of the lived body on the other.Both seek to overcome the dualism of representational mind and external world by regarding conscious experience as aperson'sbeing in the world through the medium of the body. According to the enactive paradigm, perception and action are inherentlyc onnected (Varela et al. 1990 ,Thompson 2007 : Feeling as urface is accomplished through the act of touching,s eeing an object is enabled through the activity of looking, etc. Moreover,e ach perception alreadye vokes possibilities for action, that means, the objectsa re accessible for us, "ready-to-hand",i nH eidegger'st erminology, offering affordances for our mobile body ( Gibson 1979) . In these perception-action cycles, however,inside and outside, or mind and world can no longer be separated.
In the same way, phenomenologyr egards consciousness not as as elf-enclosed entity,b ut as "being-towards-the-world" through the medium of the body ( Merleau-Ponty 1962) ,o ri no ther words, as the intentional and practical relation of the embodied subject to the objectsa nd situations it finds itself in. Embodiment is the primordial form of subjectivity,but it is at the sametime spatiality,s ituatedness, directedness to ah orizon of possibilities which offer themselvestothe body. On this assumption, however,the basic presupposition of representationalism has to be dropped. Forrepresentations 'stand for something' of which they must be separated. Now if the world is constituted for us onlyinthe ongoing interactionw ith it,a nd if we are always alreadyb odilya cting in the world, then there is no separate "inner" which could map, reconstruct or re-present the "outer".Inaconstant circular process, no segment can stand "for another".This does not exclude representations within conscious experience -for example,memories, imaginations, ideas of absent objects -but defies the monadic conception of consciousness itself as an internal representationo rm odelling of the world.
This has consequences for the question which kind of knowledge is more basic -knowing-that or knowing-how.I ft he objectsa re primarilyg iven or ready-to-hand through our embodied interactions with them, and if the world is thus always alreadydisclosed through the medium of the body, then representationalk nowledge appears onlyl ater on the scene. It is called for in the very moment when the ongoing, preflective interaction with the world or with others is disturbedorinterrupted. To use Heidegger'sexample, when ahammerbreaks, it loses its usefulnessa nd appears as merely there, "present-at-hand",a nd becomes aproblem to be solved. Similarly, when the primary,empathic, interbodily communication with others suffers an irritation or disturbance,then we become aware of them as "beingsoftheir own" which are not reallytransparent for us. In such situations of rupture we start reflecting or theorizing about the objectso r the others, asking for explanations, causes, mechanisms, or in other words, seeking knowledge about them instead of relying on knowledge by acquaintance. This irritation and the attempt to overcome the resulting worry mayb er egarded as the root of epistêmê or science in general.
The distinction between knowing-that and knowing-how has gaineda dditional momentum through the investigation of implicit memory. Thisk ind of memory is formedinthe course of the interaction of organism and environment: Recurring patterns of interaction have sedimentedi nt he form of sensorimotor schemas and corresponding bodilyd ispositions. We mays peak of an implicit "bodym emory" that underlies our everydayh abits and skills, without necessarilybeing made explicit (Fuchs 2000 (Fuchs ,2012 . This embodied knowledge is realized in suitable situations through habitual action or through overarchingv olitional acts. It then connects bodya nd environment through ongoing cycleso fp erception and action that are basedo ne arlier experiences.
In what follows, Iwill first present the concept of embodied knowledge,then connect it with the notion of bodymemory in order to elaborate its developmental dimension. Iwill then further elucidate the structure of embodied knowledge by taking the example of acquiring social skills through dyadic interactions in earlyc hildhood. Iw ill arguet hat the non-representational, enactive knowledge acquired in these interactions is the basis of intercorporeality and empathy. Explicit or propositional forms of knowledge about others ("theory of mind")a re derivedf rom later steps of development which presuppose the capacity of perspective-taking. They are not sufficient, however,f or explaining the basic empathic human capacities,o rt he knowing-how of intercorporeality.
2E mbodied knowledge
Now what is embodied knowledge? -AccordingtoRyle, knowing that is information-based knowledge that can be asked for and communicated in propositional language. In contrast, knowing how refers to training-based knowledge (e. g., how to ride ab icycle,h ow to dance aw altz) that cannot be reduced to as et of propositions. It consists of dispositions for integrative perceptions and actions which are enacted by the bodyw ithoutt argeted attention. Granted, there is no strict separation between bothk nowledge systems. Knowing thata nd knowing how togetherm ay contributet oi ntelligent behaviour,a sc an be seen in the case of an experienced surgeon (Ryle, 1949,p .4 9) . Propositional knowledge then provides higher-level strategies which in turn are realized through practical, embodied know-how.T hus, in skilful coping,t op-down and bottom-up approaches work togethera nd influencee ach other reciprocally.
The traditionalc ognitivist approach, however,h as no concept of knowing how;i nstead, it conceiveso ft he mind as ad isembodied system of representations and predictive models thata re separated from embodied action. The standard information-processingm odel has a "sense-think-act" structure (Pfeifer & Scheier 1999 ;P feifer &B ongard2 007): First,t he mind is supposedt orepresent the situation on the basis of stimuli processing ("sense"), then it computes the suitable behaviour ("think"), and finally it issues the corresponding command for bodilymotion ("act"). Thus, there are three clearlydivided stages of cognition and action:i nput,i nner computational process, and output.
This model disruptsthe unity of mind and bodyinteracting with the environment in ongoingfeedback cycles. In embodied action, there is neither place nor time for as eparate goal representation which could then produce the necessary movement.I nstead, bodilys kills and environmental affordances work together in am oment-to-moment process of continuous adjustment and fine-tuning. There is no hidden mind thatd irects the bodyb ased on deliberations or calculations. In his Phenomenology of Perception (1945/2012), Merleau-Ponty describes the example of knowing how to typewrite as follows:
[O]ne can know how to type without knowingh ow to indicatew here on the keyboardt he letters that compose the words arelocated. Knowinghow to type, then, is not the same as knowingt he location of each letter on the keyboard,n or even havinga cquired ac onditioned reflex for each letterthat is triggeredupon seeingit.
[…]I tisaquestion of a knowledgeinour hands,which is onlygiven through abodilyeffort and cannot be translated by an objective designation. The subject knows where the letters areo nt he keyboard just as we know where one of our limbs is -a knowledgeo ff amiliarity that does not provide us with ap ositioni no bjective space. (Merleau-Ponty,1945 /2012 This knowledge is not representational, but it is not subpersonal either,t hat means, onlyt ob ef ound in neurallyr ealized cognitives ystems. It is enacted by the livedorsubjective body, the bodythat Iamm yself as the agent of typing. "Consciousnessisoriginallynot an 'Ithink that',but rather an 'Ican'" (p.139), as Merleau-Ponty writes. "Ican" does not meanthe conscious control of bodily motions, but rather ap rereflective, protentional awareness of possible movements that accompanies each action. It is spread over the body, as it were, on the basis of the sensorimotor bodys chema. Throughi ts habits and skills, the body anticipates or rather implies potential actions: It is prone to act in aw ay that is influenced both by its acquired dispositions and by the affordances or possibilities of the present situation. The more skilled and habitualized the body'saction, the less we are conscious of it,asWilliam James has put it: "Consciousness deserts all processes wherei tc an no longer be of use." (James1 950,p .496) In short,t he bodyi st he subject which knows how to act.
3I mplicit and explicit knowledge
Embodied knowledge maya lso be conceived, in Polanyi'st erms,a stacit or implicit knowledge (Polanyi 1967) in that it cannotb ee xplainedo rv erbalized explicitly. When our bodyp arts coordinate while dancing at ango, when we perceive the expression of anger in someone'sf ace, or when an experienced psychiatrist intuitivelym akes ad iagnosis on the basis of various symptoms and his overall impression of the patient,there is each time more knowledge involved than we can tell. Amajor reason for this is that the forms of knowing how are basedo ni ntermodal and sensorimotor gestalt units,t hatm eans, they inte-grate different sense modalities and bodily movements into ah olistic experience, as becomes obviousi nt angod ancing -think of the typicals winga nd rhythm of amovement and its musicalgrounding. In contrast,verbal articulation mayonlyexplicate single strands out of this undetermined-manifold clew of holistic experience. Thus, it is able to class these strands into ageneral context and to render them available to communication -yetatthe price of losing the immediacy and unity of intuitive experience.
Ourprimary experiencec onsists of holisticimpressions,encompassinggestalts of perception and movement, whereas thes inglee lements areo nlye xplicateds econdarily: "It is theexplicationofthe implicit which first generates delimitablecomponents of meaning, namely throughcreating precision, selectiveemphasisand semanticrelations." (Jung2014, p. 76;m ytranslation). Onlypoetic languageisableto evokeholistic impressions.I tachieves this throughrhythmicity andprosody, multivalent usage of wordsand last not least throughthe self-referential frameofthe artwork: Ap oem does not refer denotatively to ap re-givenr eality as does ordinary speech. Of course,t he impression thus evoked is again an experience that may not be fullyt ransformed into propositional language.
The explicating analysis of implicit experiencesi nto single elements generallyruns the risk of losing the primary phenomenon. Examples for this abound: Aperceivedfacial expression is lost if one pays attention to its single features or details. Similarly,i fw ef ocus on ab odyp art,i to ftenn ol onger functions as a component of implicit capacities.Amusician who pays attention to his individual fingers duringapassagewill easilymake amistake,and atangodancer will look ridiculous once he moves his legs deliberatelylike abeginner.Practitioners in manys killed movement domains are aware that self-conscious thought can disrupt well-practised actions.
Interestingly,apathological loss of embodied knowledge mayb ef ound in schizophrenic patientswho often experience afragmentation of holistic perception into single details:
Ihavetoput things together in my head. If Ilook at my watch Isee the watch, watchstrap, face,hands,and so on, then Ihavegot to put them together to getitintoone piece. (Chapman 1966) Aschizophrenic patient of Minkowski'swas no longer able to read because '[…]hebecame attached to aword, al etter,a nd did not attend to the meaningoft he sentence.H ee xamined whethera ll the "I"sh ad dots over them, whether therew ere accents where needed, whether all the lettersh ad the same form.' (Minkowski &T argowla2 001, p .2 73) Similarly,t he units of habitual actions equencesm ay dissolve,r esulting in a pathological explicationa nd hyperreflexive awareness of normallyt acit aspects of everydayb ehaviour:
If Iwant to do somethinglike goingf or ad rink of water, I've to go over each detail -find cup, walk over,turn tap, fill cup, turn tap off, drink it. ( Chapman 1966,p .2 39) .
At times,Icould do nothingwithout thinkinga bout it.Icould not performany movement without havingt ot hink how Iw ould do it. ( de Haan &F uchs 2010) These pathological cases illustrate again thatthe implicit structure of embodied knowledge conveys aholistic mode of existence which cannot be replaced by explicit reconstruction. The bodya cts as the medium of our relation to the world preciselyi nasmucha si tw ithdrawsi nto the background of awareness. It conceals itself preciselyi nt he act of revealing the world (Leder 1992) .T urning our attention backwards on our embodied skills and habits tends to dissolve the spatial and temporalg estalt units on which they are based.
4B ody memory
Implicit knowledge or knowing how is not just an innate property of the body, but develops and constantlyc hanges over the whole life-span. The acquisition of skills and habits has come to be exploredi nc ognitive psychologyu nder the heading of "implicit" or "procedural memory" (Schacter 1987 (Schacter , 1999 , for which Iwilluse the more encompassingphenomenological notion of body memory (Fuchs 2008 (Fuchs , 2012 .
Body memory mayb ed efined as the entirety of established practices and skills that are available through the medium of the livedb odyw ithout the need to remember earlier situations. Habits formedthrough repetition and practice are activated of their own accord; well-rehearsed sequenceso fm ovements have been incorporated, thus becomingabodilyc apacity -like the upright gait,s peakingo rw riting,u sing instrumentsl ike ab icycle, at ypewritero ra piano.T his bodilym emory,w hich was first considered by Maine de Biran (1799 Biran ( /1953 and Henri Bergson (1896/2007), does not re-present or "presentify" the past,b ut rather re-enacts it in the ongoing conduct of life. In the last analysis,all capacities during one'slife point to aprimordial capacity of the embodied subject,t oabasic "Ic an" (Husserl, 1952, 253 ).
There are two major ways of acquiringb odilyh abits and skills: On the one hand, we can explicitly synthesize single elements of perception and movement through deliberate training.What is perceivedo rp erformedp iece by piece at Embodied Knowledge -Embodied Memory first is graduallyi ntegrated and incorporateda sanovel skill. Thus, we have learnt at primary school to spell and connect single letters until we could read the whole words and sentences.Weh avel earnt to dance at angob yc ombining the single movementsu ntil the bodyh ad integrated them into an overarching flow of rhythm, dynamics and movement.G ranted, these learning processes are basedo np re-existingg estalt units (the worda sh eard, the swingo fb odily movement,e tc.) in which the explicit elements mayb ei ntegrated.
On the other hand,m anys kills and habits are acquired implicitly or unnoticed,n amelya sa" learning by doing",j ust through repeated practice, be it in dealing with objects or through interactingwith others. Indeed, the most fundamental skills which have disclosedt he world for us and upon which our everydayp ractices are basedh aves edimented into our bodym emory in the first and second year of life without anye xplicit teaching. This applies in particular to a type of memoryt owhich we owe the skill of bodilyinteracting with others, and which Ic all intercorporeal memory (Fuchs 2012) . In what follows, Iw ill look at some stages of its development.
5I ntercorporealm emory
Infantr esearch has shownt hat newbornsa re alreadya blet oi mitatef acial expressionso fo thers like frowning, openingo ft he mouth, protrudingt he tongue,e tc. (Meltzoff &M oore1 977, 1989) ,l ater on also emotional expressionss uch as smiling or surprise. This shows that they aree quipped with an innate bodys chema which enables them to translatethe seen gestures intotheir own feltmovement,thus gainingabasic sense of familiarity with others.A se arlya si nt he first months,i nfants arealso capableofdiscerningemotions such as happiness,sadness,and surprise in thep ostures,m ovements,f acial expressions andv ocal intonations of others (Hobson 2005,p p. 39).T he basisf or this is that different sense modalities and movementsc an have the same 'kinematics' andt hus express thes amea ffect,w hich maybestberenderedinmusical qualities (‚crescendo', ‚decrescendo',flowing,bursting, pulsing, etc.). The feelingofjoy andthe various expressions of joyhavesimilar intermodal dynamics,and this is the basis for the directperception of others' emotional states even in earliest childhood. Affectivity,h owever,i sp rimarilyn ot an inner or individual state, butadyadic experienceo fm other and infant,m ediated throughe xpression andb odilyr esonance in subtle gestural,f acial and vocali nteractions.A lready 6 -8w eeks after birth, so-called "proto-conversations" arise, that means,a lternating vocalizations and gestures (Trevarthen 1979) , overallafine-tunedc o-ordinationo fm ovements and expressive signals which mayb ec ompared to ac ouple dance. Thesep henom-enaof"interbodilyresonance" (Fuchs u. De Jaegher 2009) and "affect attunement" (Stern 1985) generatee ncompassingemotional states:The emerging affectduringa joyful playing situation between mother and infant maynot be divided and distributed amongthem, but arisesfromthe sharedsocial situation. Emotions areprimarilye mbedded in intercorporeality and interaffectivity.
Moreover,r ecurrent patterns of interaction and affect attunement are sedimented as interactive schemas in the infant'sb odym emory( " schemeso f being-with", Stern 1985), for example "mummy-feeding-me", "daddy-playingwith-me",e tc. This resultsi nw hat Stern (1998) has called implicit relational knowing -an embodied, intuitive knowledge of how to interact with others, how to have fun together,h ow to elicit attention, to avoid rejection etc. It is a temporallyo rganised, "musical" memory for the rhythm, dynamics and undertones which resonate in the interaction with others. Thus, long before verbal communication infants alreadya cquire ap rimary understanding of others through shared practicesr ecorded in their intercorporeal memory.
6E mbodiede mpathy and itsd isturbance in autism
This is the basis of ap rimary form of empathyt hat emergesi nf ace-to-face encounters: In embodied interaction, the other is not assumed 'behind' his action, but he enacts and expresses his feelingsa nd intentions in his conduct.E mbodied relational knowledge conveys an intuitivea wareness of the other'sa ffective state. In perceiving his expressive movementsa nd actions as embedded in the shared context, "[…]o ne alreadys ees their meaning.N oi nference to ah idden set of mental states is necessary." (Gallagher &Z ahavi 2008, 185) Moreover,i n social interaction, one'so wn bodyi sa ffected by the other in various formso f bodilyr esonance, sensations, tensions, movement tendencies etc. This resonance forms part of the embodied knowledge that allows us to understand the other'ss tate. In contrast to this account,the currentlypredominant theories of social cognition are mainlyb asedo nr epresentationalist approaches: Concepts such as Theory of Mind, mentalization or mindreading( Antonietti 2006,G oldman 2012)a ssume af undamental inaccessibilityo ft he otherw hose hidden mental states,intentions or feelingsmay onlybeinferred from his external bodilybehaviour by using some sort of rule-based 'mindreading'.Social cognition would thus be basedonobservation, inferenceand knowing that,eventhough it maynot always be expressed in propositional terms. However,our primary and everydayencounters with others are not observations from a3 rd person point of view,b ut embodied interactions within the 2 nd -person perspective.Inthese,wenormallydon'tuse anyimaginative modelling or inference; instead, we immediatelyperceive the other'sintentions and emotions in his expressive behaviour. Of course, we mays ometimes apply methods of explicit conjecturingorinferring another'smental state. This happens in particular when an irritation, misunderstanding or disturbance occurs,a nd we ask ourselveswhy the other said or did what he did, what he might be thinking or feeling,etc. We can then alsotranspose ourselvesinto the other,takehis perspective, reason about his motives, search for his hidden intentions etc. As Iargued at the beginning, knowing that is called for when the ongoing,p reflective interaction with the world or with others is disturbed. But it is not the primary or default mode of social understanding,a nd it is onlya cquired much later on in childhood. Rather,implicit intercorporeal or relational knowing forms the basis of intersubjectivity.This mayfinally be illustrated by another psychopathological example,n amely autism.
As is well known, children with autism lack the basic emotional contact with others, which leads to avariety of social, communicative and cognitive deficits. Accordingt oc urrent cognitivet heories of autism,t he disorder is duet oadifficulty to "read other people'sm inds," or to imagine what they are thinking or feeling.The suggestion is that autistic people lack a "Theory of Mind" (ToM) -the purported neural or cognitive device that computes others' underlying intentions from their perceivedb ehaviours. In recent years, however,c riticism has been raised by phenomenological psychiatrists and philosophers, arguing that the deficit is rather caused by failures of earlyi nteraction and intercorporeality (Hobson 1993 , Gallagher 2004 ,F uchs 2015 . This is supported by the fact that manyautistic symptoms such as lack of emotional contact,ofinterest in others, agitation and anxiety are alreadyp resent in the first years of life, that means, long before the supposed aget oa cquireaToMw hich is around 4y ears.
Ihavepointed out before that knowing how is essentiallybasedonprocesses of gestalt formation that enable us to perceive and act in aholistic wayinstead of being aware of the single elements. This applies for social cognition as well: The expression of afaceisonlyperceivedwhen we do not focus on asingle feature or detail. Now it has been demonstrated that autistic children show problems preciselyi ne stablishing perceptual ands ituational coherence: They focus on single parts or elements rather than perceiving the gestalt of objects, and they tend to treat thingsa nd events decontextualized, thus missing theirp articular meaningp rovided by the situation as aw hole (Frith 1989 (Frith ,H appé 1995 .
Accordingly, eyet racking studies have shown that children with autism focus on peripheral featureso ff aces,and on irrelevant details of interactive sit-uations while missing the relevant social cues (Klin et al. 2003) . This failureo f holistic cognition mayhavesome positive effects such as remembering unrelated or non-sensical items,h owever,i ts ignificantlyi nterferes with the development of social understanding. Thus, as Ih avep ointed out above, affect attunement is cruciallyb ased on perceiving emotional cues (gestures,f acial movements, voicings) as holistic expressions and as embedded in recurrent situations. Similarly, understandingt he intentions of others depends on learning how to relate their gestures and actions to the context in order to grasp theirm eaning.
Such deficits of autisticc hildren converget oafundamental disturbance of embodied social perception and interactionv ery earlyi nl ife. They are not able to acquire the implicit relational knowledge that is based on schemes of being-with-others taken up into one'sintercorporeal memory.Whata utisticchildren lack is thus not atheoretical concept of otherminds but aprimary sense of bodilybeing-with-others. ToM-likestrategies of explicit mentalizingand inferring from social cues are rather employed by high-functioning autistic individuals as a compensation for the lacking capacities of primary intercorporeality.T hus, Temple Grandin,awoman with Asperger'ss yndrome,d escribed her problems with interpersonal relations to OliverS acks as follows:
It has to do, she has inferred, with an implicit knowledge of social conventions and codes, of cultural presuppositionsofevery sort.This implicit knowledge,which every normal person accumulates and generates throughout life on the basis of experience and encounters with others,Temple seems to be largely devoid of. Lackingit, she has insteadto'compute' others' intentions and states of mind, to try to makealgorithmic,explicit,what for the rest of us is second nature. (Sacks 1995, p. 270) These compensatory strategies enable functional interactionsw ith otherst oacertain degree, butfailtoestablishthe primarysense of being-with-otherswhich is normallyc onveyedb yi ntercorporealitya nd implicit relational knowledge:
She is now aware of the existenceofthese social signals.She can infer them, she says,but she herself cannot perceive them, cannot participateinthis magical communication directly […] . Knowingt his intellectually, she does her best to compensate, bringingimmense intellectual effort and computationalp owert ob ear on matters that others understand with unthinkinge ase. This is whys he often feels excluded, an alien. (Sacks 1995, p. 272) As we can see from Grandin'sreport,the implicit relationalknowledge mediated by the bodyand its intercorporeal memory cannot be substituted by expliciti nferenceo rr ule-based theorizing;i no ther words, knowledge by acquaintance with others mayn ot be replaced by knowledge about them.
7S ummary
Embodied knowledge is the foundation of our familiarity with the world and with other people. It is ak nowledge and skill which is realized in perceiving and reactingo ns ituations, without needing targeted attention or memory.The subjectofk nowing is itself embodied: It finds these knowingsa nd skills not inside, but onlyinits practical engagement with the world. In contrast, representational,s ymbol-basedf orms of knowledge -knowing that -arise from an indirect,s econdary relation to the world which the human mind is capable of by taking ad istance form objectsa nd situation and representingt hem as such. This presupposes,however,thatthe world is alreadydisclosed to us via the medium of the bodyw hich has acquainted itself with the world from birth on. We experience the world, because our bodyh as become transparent for it; that means, we experience the implicit actions and affections of our body as the objects and situations of our environment.
Following Polanyi (1967 Polanyi ( , 1969 we maydescribethis transparent structure of our experience as an interplayb etween the "distal" pole, i. e. the thematic, explicit or focal object of awareness,a nd the "proximal" or bodilyp ole, which recedes from attention and is known onlyi natacit,n on-thematic manner:
Our bodyisthe onlyassemblyofthings known almost exclusively by relyingonour awareness of them for attendingtosomethingelse […]Every time we makesense of the world, we relyo no ur tacit knowledgeo fi mpacts made by the world on our bodya nd the complex responses of our bodyo nt hese impacts. ( Polanyi 1969, p. 147) The bodyisthus "passed over in silence",asSartre (1956) put it.Inasmuch as we perceive or act through an organ of our body, "it necessarilyr ecedesf rom the perceptual field it discloses" (Leder 1990,p .1 4) , and the same applies to the skills that are realized by the organs.T hus as am edium, the bodyw ithdraws in the tacit dimension; "it conceals itself preciselyi nt he act of revealing what is Other" (Leder 1990 ,p.2 2),a nd yetr emains the coreo fo ur self. The transparency of the bodya rises preciselyf rom the embodied nature of the mind.
Thereforei nt he application of embodied knowledge or skills we are not dealing with ab lind or even subpersonal occurrence which we could onlya scribe to a(neuro-)physiological process. The skills thatare based on bodymemory,s uch as tangod ancing,a re realized by tuning in to the familiar rhythm of movement and enacting its particulars tyle. It is Im yself who is dancing,n ot abodymachine commanded by adisembodied mind. This allows me to conduct and modulatethe body'senactments, like aconductor its orchestra, without having to generate them, for they happen of their own accord.
